what I like about what they call “neo Meinongianism” is while espousing what they’re calling “Noneism” (the notion that “some things do not exist”), it then frees up the notion that objects are constructed of properties. You can then have existent objects with properties and also have non-existent objects with properties. If it turns out a non-existent object _does_ exist, you simply have to switch it over into the other category without ever having to change that it consists of properties.
I’m sure there’s a naughty catch around here; I’m no pro at this time. Just trying to find things that fit.
I liked David Lewis’ way of looking at things – but there was really just him — and it doesn’t seem so terribly different than this Meinong family.
and, oddly, it meshes with this thing I was working on a few months back. In May 2021, I’d put this together to summarize my progress in this area and then set it aside.
It’s today, September-something that I tripped over this neo-Meinongianism and realize it’s more-or-less the same notion. I had no problem with fictions and non-fiction being reasoned about in the same way.