i was called Canadian a few times in my life. The semi flat affect, dry wit that’s very often inappropriate, that half frozen smile of “come on guys that was funny wasn’t it? well i think it’s funny… i think” there’s also a “Canadian everyman” Image that he calls into. Michael Myers, martin short, john candy, dan akroyd, rick morantis all seems to draw from a similar well

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what I like about what they call “neo Meinongianism” is while espousing what they’re calling “Noneism” (the notion that “some things do not exist”), it then frees up the notion that objects are constructed of properties. You can then have existent objects with properties and also have non-existent objects with properties. If it turns out a non-existent object _does_ exist, you simply have to switch it over into the other category without ever having to change that it consists of properties.

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“An Analogy Between Modality and Time What might a proponent of MOP (Meinongian Ontological Pluralism) say about time? The view I have in mind can be understood as the temporal analog of the following modal metaphysic. Take Lewis’s modal realism, but reject actuality as indexical; instead, take actuality and mere possibility as ways of being. There is the actual world, which enjoys actual-existence; the merely possible worlds, which enjoy possible-existence; and the impossible worlds, which don’t exist at all. Both actual and merely possible entities exist in some way or other and therein exemplify the properties they have. Impossible entities are unreal, and therein are said to encode the properties they have. This latter, distinctively Meinongian move, helps to ground truths about impossible things, while preserving the intuition that impossible things do not exist in any way. The analogy to time is straightforward. There are the present entities, which enjoy present-existence; the past entities, which enjoy past-existence; and future entities, which dont exist at all. Both present and past entities exist in some way or other, and therein exemplify the properties they have. Future entities are unreal, and therein encode the properties they have. This latter move helps ground truths about the future without jeopardizing the intuition that the future is entirely nonexistent. On this view, the future is unreal, while the past and the present make up a four-dimensional manifold of concrete existents. Further, this manifold grows as time passes—hence, Meinongian Growing Block Theory, or MGB. The above analogy suggests a deep metaphysical connection between the future and the impossible—one that some might find surprising. I think this upshot is actually a welcome one. Not only do we have strong intuitions about the unreality of both the future and the impossible, but there are also more substantive reasons for admitting the analogy. Paradigmatic impossible objects are inconsistent ones—objects that have some property, F, and some property, G, where F and G are incompatible (e.g. roundness and squareness). In a way, these impossible objects have too many properties to be real. Additionally, our intuitions about the unreality of the future appear to be linked to our intuition that the future is open—that facts about the future have yet to be settled. One way of making sense of an open future is to suggest that there is some kind of indeterminacy regarding future property instantiations. That is, the future is partly constituted by incomplete objects, where for some property, F, the future object in question has neither F nor not-F. On such a view, these future objects have too few properties to be real. Thus, there is good reason for thinking that there is an intimate, metaphysical link between the future and the impossible because, plausibly, both sorts of entities deviate from the level of determinacy required for reality. ” https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1238/ On the Plurality of Existences, Isaiah Lin, 2020

“An Analogy Between Modality
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MIDDLE GROUND. Legal Theory compared with Cognitive Linguistics / prototype theory. Meta-theoretical Position One final similarity between Hart’s theory and prototype theory should be mentioned. It refers to no particular features of these theories, but rather to their meta-theoretical position in the disciplines they come from. The general purpose of open texture theory for Hart was to establish a middle-ground between two extreme positions in the tradition of legal thought: formalism and rule-scepticism, which he famously dubbed “the Scylla and Charybdis of juristic theory”. On the one hand, he rejected the possibility of mechanical jurisprudence associated with legal formalism, namely the idea that legal rules can be applied to cases through the sole use of logical deduction. Such approach seems plausible in plain cases, but it will inevitably fail in cases of the penumbra. On the other hand, he rejected another extreme view, namely rule-scepticism, associated mostly with American legal realists who refused to credit legal rules with any binding force due to the indeterminacy of linguistic meaning. Hart claimed that such a view equates the whole law with penumbra cases and ignores the existence of plain cases, which are much more common and unproblematic. Hart’s ambition was to strike a balance between those two extremes. He used the open texture theory, characterised by the distinction between the core and the penumbra, to argue that the law is neither entirely determinate nor entirely indeterminate. Instead, it is determinate in paradigm cases and indeterminate in penumbral ones. Quite similarly, prototype theorists, and cognitive linguists in general, take a middle-ground between two, more traditional, approaches to semantics. First and foremost, they oppose the approach called “objectivism”, “rationalism” or “literalism”, as typified by Katz and Fodor’s semantic theory in linguistics and Frege-inspired formal semantics in analytic philosophy, best illustrated by the mind-as-a-computer metaphor. This approach supposedly holds that “all meaning is specifiable in sets of literal concepts and propositions that can apply directly to our given experience, and that reasoning is a rule-like activity that operates logically and linearly with these concepts”. At the same time, cognitive linguists defy postmodern approaches to meaning referred to as “subjectivism” or “relativism”. These approaches claim that there are no absolute foundations of thought and language, and that meaning is merely a product of social construction. Both “objectivism” and “subjectivism” are faces of semantic fundamentalism, the difference being that the former do it explicitly, while the latter only implicitly.Footnote23 Cognitive linguists, on the other hand, defend a moderate position, claiming that meaning is both principled and flexible, universal and relative, objective and socially constructed at the same time. Prototype theory plays a vital role in this argument.

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