can there BE abstract symbol manipulation as you find in computers?

contains some arguments against computational theory of mind and redirects towards an enacted mind view, which is related to embodied cognition and other situated models.

The trouble with Searle’s view is that computers are symbol manipulation machines.

They manipulate abstracts.

What is the physical basis for an abstract?

In short, the dichotomy remains in a computational theory of mind. 

The difference between “inner and outer” worlds remains. 

I don’t think Searle is wrong but rather it is incomplete. 

What is the nature of the internal abstractions we manipulate internally? If there is no distinction between the inner and outer worlds and they are, instead, one “thing” that we are a part of and included within, can there BE abstract symbol manipulation as you find in computers?

Or is it really something else?

He rightly, I believe, points out that a simulation is NOT a duplication. I’m very glad he made that distinction clear.

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