Can each of the description of the different hybrids be rewritten in a way that somebody who has trouble comprehending the notion of belief revision (likely due to having noisy priors that interfere with normal bayesian updating)
Bayesian reasoning (adapted): A method that uses probability to update ideas based on new information. This approach mixes existing knowledge with new data to adjust probabilities without relying on the idea of belief revision.
Subjective probability (adapted): Individuals hold personal probabilities for specific events or ideas. These probabilities are shaped by personal experiences, cognitive tendencies, and emotions, without the need for formal belief revision.
Signal detection theory: A psychological framework for understanding decision-making under uncertainty, which considers the balance between correct and incorrect detections of a signal amidst noise. This concept doesn’t require belief revision.
Expected utility theory (adapted): A decision-making theory that combines probabilities with individual preferences to calculate the expected usefulness of various outcomes, guiding choices without the need for formal belief revision.
Confirmation bias (adapted): The psychological tendency to search for, interpret, and remember information that supports one’s existing ideas while ignoring or discounting contradictory evidence, without necessarily invoking belief revision.
The availability heuristic (adapted): A cognitive tendency where people overestimate the likelihood of events that are easily recalled in their memory, often due to recent exposure or emotional impact. This concept doesn’t require belief revision.
The representativeness heuristic (adapted): A cognitive tendency where people judge the likelihood of an event based on how similar it is to a typical example or stereotype, often leading to errors in probability estimation, without relying on belief revision.