But a particular process does not lead directly into a a universal substance because it is of a second order as it rests upon the particular substance, not the process that made the particular substance.

But a particular process does not lead directly into a a universal substance because it is of a second order as it rests upon the particular substance, not the process that made the particular substance.
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    Still playing with the DAG I made of Barry Smith’s Ontological Sextant. Here I moved them around to show that the “particular process” (think: computing) leads to “universal process” and contributes to a “particular substance”. You _can_ stop there in your analysis and ignore the rest.
    I think in the case of, say, Wolfram’s New Kind of Science and in particular his new Physics model, well, this can apply although in an interestingly reverse fashion (which if successful can then flip around and be used to describe the particulars from which to derive universals… but right now it’s universal processes looking for particulars…
    I’m fascinated by this model because a) I tripped over it on accident (looking up a Spreadsheet ontology only to find Barry Smith making fun of OTHER philosophers by calling their work “spreadsheet ontologies” derisively – and I was going to ignore it but when I realized he has been working (for decades) on 2nd order which is the realm that interests me – I had to look closer – and so far this is jiving with my way of thinking. So far. I’m surprised for even though it’s an ontology, it successfully includes particular processes that lead to unique things EVEN though the processes themselves may be universal. In short, the universal processes are generic universals of PARTICULAR processes and it is the PARTICULAR processes that contribute to particular substance which THEN can lead to universal substance. But a particular process does not lead directly into a a universal substance because it is of a second order as it rests upon the particular substance, not the process that made the particular substance. Oh that made more sense when I wrote it.
    In short, the algorithm (process universal) is only that way because particular processes happened. It isn’t universal processes that guide the particular but it is similarities in the particular that leads to the universalizing of processes. If I’m getting this right.

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