A nonassociative schema theory of cognitive incompatibility Asghar Iran-Nejad Cognitive psychology has generated much research on similarity and the role it plays in the organization of knowledge in long-term memory. By comparison, little is known about the related concept of cognitive incompatibility. Building on the idea that mental schemas are incompatible to the extent they share elements, I discuss in this paper a non-connectionist schema theory of incompatibility and compare it with the connectionist schema theory proposed by Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton (1986).

Cognitive psychology has generated much research on similarity and the role it plays in the organization of knowledge in long-term memory. By comparison, little is known about the related concept of cognitive incompatibility. Building on the idea that mental schemas are incompatible to the extent they share elements, I discuss in this paper a non-connectionist schema theory of incompatibility and compare it with the connectionist schema theory proposed by Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton (1986).